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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

In its decisions concerning discrimination by public officials, the
Fourth Circuit has demonstrated the relevance of demographic data.
The Morton case indicated that demographic changes will be considered as a factor, perhaps a decisive one, in determining whether a
school board must justify its conduct involving the racial makeup of
its schools' faculties. However, in Wheeler, the court decided that
when the makeup of the student bodies of schools was involved, demographic changes would apply in the court's decisions to construct
remedies only when the school system had earlier attained a completely desegregated state. Otherwise, the demographic changes
would be considered of secondary importance to state-imposed segregation. Finally, the court in Vollin noted that it would presume that
elected officials represented and were responsive to all voters within
an at-large system' 5 absent evidence to the contrary, such as racially
discriminatory conduct or statements reflecting bigotry. Without
solid proof that a group's voting power has been diluted by actions
of state officials, the court will not entertain suits requesting changes
in election systems.

VI.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. Free Speech: Telephone Misuse and Disorderly Conduct
Statutes
Any statute which proscribes certain conduct must be free of
vagueness and uncertainty, both in meaning and in application.'
Moreover, even if such a statute has clearly defined limits, those
limits may not be so broad as to restrict constitutionally protected
freedoms. 2 In addition, a statute which regulates the exercise of unprotected expression for the purpose of maintaining public order
must not be susceptible of interpretation which may inhibit the exercise of protected expression.3 The Fourth Circuit recently reaffirmed
791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3264 (U.S. November 4, 1975) (No. 75-5304).
'1 The demographic consideration of the racial makeup of a system's population
would not by itself be sufficient to rebut this presumption.
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964). See, e.g., Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
2 See, e.g. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
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these principles in Squire v. Pace,I holding Virginia's disorderly conduct statute unconstitutional. 5 The court, in a per curiam opinion,
affirmed the decision of the district court' which had disallowed a
conviction under the statute due to the statute's vagueness and overbreadth.7 The principles of overbreadth were also applied by the
Fourth Circuit in Walker v. Dillard8 which held Virginia's telephone
misuse statute9 facially overbroad and, hence, unconstitutional. Both
Squire and Walker demonstrate that although offensive speech is a
legitimate concern for state control, careful delimiting of offensive
and unprotected speech is required to prevent inhibition of the exercise of protected speech. 0
Vagueness and overbreadth are two distinct doctrines despite
some degree of conceptual interrelatedness. Vagueness considers due
process deficiencies under the fourteenth amendment, and seeks to
correct those defects in statutes which fail "to give fair notice and
warning as to what conduct is proscribed."" To avoid a finding of
516 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3202 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975).
5 The statute provides in part:
If any person behaves in a riotous or disorderly manner in any street,
highway, public building, or any other public place ... or causes any
unnecessary disturbance in or on any public conveyance, by running
through it, climbing through windows or upon the seats, failing to
move to another seat when lawfully requested to so move by the operator, or otherwise annoying passengers or employees therein, he shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-253.2 (Supp. 1975).
Squire v. Pace, 380 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Va. 1974).
The Fourth Circuit's per curiam opinion summarized the district court's conclusions concerning the statute thusly:
(1) it did not inform a defendant what conduct is proscribed; (2) it
allowed policemen, prosecutors, and courts to impose their own personal predilections in determining what should be permissible behavior; and (3) it could inhibit the exercise of first amendment rights
because it has been construed to embrace speech, which, unaccompanied by acts, need do no more than outrage the sense of public
decency.
516 F.2d at 241.
8 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3229 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1975).
' VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-238 (Supp. 1975) provided:
If any person shall curse or abuse anyone, or use vulgar, profane,
threatening or indecent language over any telephone in this State, he
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. ...
" See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
Squire v. Pace, 380 F. Supp. 269, 275 (W.D. Va. 1974). A statute which does
not clearly define its prohibitions is void for vagueness since it "fails to give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the
statute." Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972), quoting United
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vagueness, a statute must prescribe a specific legislative standard
without allowing or being susceptible to alternative and arbitrary
interpretations and enforcement standards. 2 When particular rights
protected by the first amendment are to be regulated, statutes must
be sufficiently specific to prevent infringement or inhibition of such
rights through deprivation of due process. 3 Overbreadth, in contrast,
specifically encompasses the protection of first amendment rights;
the doctrine prohibits statutory provisions which interfere with the
use of such safeguarded rights. 4 A statute may not deter the exercise
of first amendment rights by creating fear of punishment in an individual for exercising those rights."
In Squire, the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of Virginia's disorderly conduct statute. Squire was convicted for his activities during his placard demonstration at a University of Virginia
ROTC review. The Virginia Supreme Court upheld Squire's conviction"6 without considering the constitutional validity of the statute
either on its face or as construed by courts within the state. 7 Upon
considering Squire's petition for writ of habeas corpus, the district
court concluded that the statute could not satisfy the constitutional
dictates against vagueness and overbreadth. 5
The district court determined that Virginia's disorderly conduct
statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad since the statute's terms provided no guidance as to the limits of proscribed behavior." According to the district court, the state court had not narrowly
States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954). See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589 (1967).
12 E.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
13 E.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360 (1964).
" See cases cited note 13 supra.
15E.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972).
11Squire v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 260, 199 S.E. 2d 534 (1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 909 (1974).
1' The statute had earlier been construed by the Virginia Supreme Court to include speech as prohibited conduct when it was "of a nature to corrupt the public
morals or to outrage the sense of public decency, whether committed by words or acts."
Hackney v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 888, 890, 45 S.E.2d 241, 242 (1947), quoting 17
AM. JuR. 99. See 516 F.2d at 241.
" 380 F. Supp. at 280.
The district court explained:
The operative words-"behaves in a riotous or disorderly manner"-provide practically no guidance to the individual who might
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construed the statute to prevent its unconstitutional application; 2
Squire could not have known which of his actions would violate the
statute. Moreover, the court determined that the statute did not
prevent the police, judge, or jury from making their own determinations as to what constituted disorderly or riotous behavior. Most importantly, the court found the statute to have "strong potential" for
inhibiting the exercise of first amendment rights 21 by allowing public
officials to prevent free expression according to what may be pres22
ently unpopular, challenging, or unsettling speech.
violate the statute or to police, prosecutors, judges or juries who are
given the authority to enforce it.
380 F. Supp. at 276.
2 Id. at 276-77. It had been within the power of the state court narrowly to
construe the statute for practical application within legal limits. A statute's constitutionality is often dependent on appropriately limited application by state courts, and
"[o]nly the [state] courts can supply the requisite construction, since of course 'we
lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation.' United States v. ThirtySeven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971)." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520
(1972).
Two Virginia cases which dealt with the statute applied only "usual definitions"
of disorderly conduct which did not supply a limiting construction of the statute. In
Hackney v. Commonwealth, it was
conceded that the language used constitutes disorderly conduct within
the usual definition of that term, which is "all such acts and conduct
as are of a nature to corrupt the public morals or to outrage the sense
of public decency, whether committed by words or acts."
186 Va. 888, 890, 45 S.E.2d 241, 242 (1947) (citation omitted).
Taylor v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 214, 46 S.E.2d 384 (1948)) concerned the failure
of a black woman to move to another bus seat when so requested by the bus driver.
Her conviction under the disorderly conduct statute was reversed since "[s]he was
guilty of no definite misbehavior or misconduct in the sense that she was disorderly or
turbulent." Id. at 221, 46 S.E.2d 384, 387. The court inferred that the statute could
be violated by words having "vicious or injurious tendency, offensive to good morals
or public decency." Id.
The district court in Squire stated:
The judicial gloss placed on these words has simply been that of
asking whether a given set of facts amounts to a corruption of public
morals or an outrage to public decency. Rather than limiting the openended scope of the statute, such an approach magnifies its infirmities.
380 F. Supp. at 277.
21380 F. Supp. at 278.
22 Id. at 279. See Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
The disorderly conduct statute in question has been amended to provide in part:
Any person who shall behave in a riotous or disorderly manner or
cause any unnecessary disturbance in any street, highway, public
building, public place, or while in or on a public conveyance, and any
person who shall willfully interrupt or unnecessarily disturb any meeting of the governing body of any political subdivision of this State or
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Although the right of free expression must be jealously guarded
against encroachment, a statute which regulates the exercise of free
speech in a public place is a necessary tool for the states to maintain
public order.2? One manner in which a state fulfills its responsibility
to maintain public order is exemplified by statutes intended to protect the public from harrassing or obscene speech which is not constitutionally protected. 2 A statute which prohibits unprotected speech
is constitutional, however, only if its application does not inhibit
protected speech; 25 the potentiality of such application will be established by state court construction of the statute. 6
The Fourth Circuit applied these principles of overbreadth in
Walker v. Dillard.2 7 In Walker, the plaintiff had been convicted for
violating Virginia's telephone misuse statute.2 8 The district court's
dismissal of Walker's petition for habeas corpus29 was reversed by the
Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit determined that Walker's challenge was appropriate regardless of whether her actual speech might
have been constitutionally prohibited under a more narrowly drawn
statute.3° The court concluded that the statute unconstitutionally
a division or agency thereof, or of any school, literary society or place
of religious worship, or who, being intoxicated, shall disturb such a
meeting, whether willfully or not, shall be guilty of a Class I misdemeanor.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (Repl. Vol. 1975).
" See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
State interests in maintaining order must be carefully balanced against protection of
first amendment rights of expression. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
2" See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S.

229 (1972). It is well established that obscene material is not protected by the first
amendment, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), but "[s]tate statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully limited." Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973). See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676
(1968).
See Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975).
v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
27523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1975).
"

25 Gooding
21

See note 9 supra.

2"Walker v. Dillard, 363 F. Supp. 921 (W.D. Va. 1973).
10The court stated that:

the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing "attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn
with the requisite narrow specificity."

523 F.2d at 4, quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1974);
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972). See also, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 486 (1965).
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prohibited all curses, abusive comment, vulgarity, profanity, and any
intemperate, indignant, or indiscreet utterance over the telephone
without regard to specific circumstances or parties.3
The Fourth Circuit held that the statute was facially overbroad
and its potential application had not been restricted by state court
construction. Under traditional constitutional doctrine, only narrowly drawn statutes may prohibit unprotected classes of speech such
as obscene, threatening, and harrassing telephone calls.2 A statute
overbroad on its face may, however, be preserved through a narrowing
construction and application by state courts. 3 The Fourth Circuit
rejected the district court's finding that Virginia's interest in eliminating telephone obscenity served by itself to narrow the scope of the
statute within constitutional limits." The circuit court concluded
that the lower court erroneously construed the statute as proscribing
only threatening and obscene phone calls,n since, in the absence of a
restrictive state court construction, the entire statute was susceptible
of overbroad interpretation and application. 6
11 523 F.2d at 5.
32 See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972). The Fourth Circuit presumed that
obscene telephone calls were unprotected speech. The basis for this presumption is
well-established:
[Ilt is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at
all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined
and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (footnotes omitted).
3 E.g., Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972). Federal courts "lack jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation." United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971). See e.g.,
General Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 322 U.S. 335 (1944), which affirms the
premise that state court application of state laws is controlling.
1 523 F.2d at 6. The district court had further determined that the statute's
language was sufficiently explicit to be understood clearly and meaningfully.
Impossible standards of specificity are not required. The test is
whether the language conveys sufficiently definite warnings as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understandings and
practices.
363 F. Supp. at 927 (citations omitted). The Fourth Circuit did not consider a vagueness challenge against the statute in the absence of a record of lower state court
proceedings.
1 523 F.2d at 6. A federal court cannot authoritatively anticipate the manner in
which a state court may define or otherwise narrow a statute's application.
38Id. at 5. Most operative words of the statute were "susceptible of an overbroad
construction." Id. "Threat" must be narrowly defined to prevent infringement of constitutionally protected speech. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). Proscrip-
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Certain classes of offensive expression, whether written or oral, are
not protected by the first amendment. These narrowly defined classes
include obscene language and language which tends to provoke an
3
immediate breach of peaceY.
The Fourth Circuit decisions in Squire
39
v. Pace8 and Walker v. Dillard
demonstrate the need for careful
drafting of statutes regulating unprotected classes of speech. In
Squire, the challenged disorderly conduct statute failed to present a
specific standard which definitively categorized unprotected expression. Consequently, the statute was rendered constitutionally inadequate because of its potential applicability to all speech deemed "disturbing." Likewise, in Walker, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the
principle that potential application of an overbroad statute's imprecise standard of conduct to constitutionally permitted speech renders
that statute unconstitutional. A statute which regulates expression
must avoid both overbreadth and vagueness by narrowly and explicitly classifying proscribed conduct.
B. Patronage Dismissal: First and Fourteenth Amendments
Not Violated by Employee Dismissal from Non-Policy-Making
Position
Historically, public employees have been subject to arbitrary patronage dismissals. However, legislation over the past century has
provided increasing protection to public civil service employees from
unwarranted patronage discharges.' Public employees not protected
by civil service legislation are largely unable, however, to obtain judicial relief from patronage dismissals .2 Nevertheless, important constitutional issues have been presented by patronage employees who
tion of "abusive language" is unconstitutional where its meaning is not refined through
state court interpretation to mean only, "fighting words." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972). What is "vulgar," "profane," or "indecent" is not necessarily obscene and
is protected speech unless narrowly construed to prohibit obscenity alone. Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
" Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
516 F.2d 240 (4th Cir. 1975).

3' 523 F.2d 3.
See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 148-150 (1974).
Generally, the legislatures are considered the proper source of relief from patronage discharges. See Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482, 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1020 (1972).
2
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have challenged their removal from public employment. Such discharges have been challenged as violating both the first amendment's
protection of political association and the fourteenth amendment's
guarantee of procedural due process.
The Fourth Circuit recently confronted a challenge of a patronage
dismissal in Nunnery v. Barber.3 In that case, Nunnery challenged
her release from a position as a West Virginia state liquor store manager. Nunnery complained that she was forced to vacate her position
in order to allow the appointment of a more active political party
member.' Plaintiff's position was not included within civil service
coverage.' The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding'
that relieving Nunnery of her employment responsibilities was not a
deprivation of fourteenth amendment due process. Moreover, the circuit court found no violation of the plaintiff's first amendment
rights.7
The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the traditional view' that a patronage employee dismissal due to political affiliation is not constitutionally prohibited. Under conventional analysis, state interest in government is deemed sufficiently compelling-more compelling than employee interests in constitutional protection-that employee protection from political discharges is provided solely through civil service
statutes. State legislation is the means by which any spoils system
injustices are to be corrected The Fourth Circuit explained that
judicial review of patronage dismissal challenges is not merited'" unless summary removal violates due process."
In view of a recent Seventh Circuit decision,' 2 the Fourth Circuit's
503 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005 (1975).
365 F. Supp. 691, 692 (S.D.W.Va. 1973).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60-2-12 (1966). See also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-6-2 (1971
Repl. Vol.).
1 365 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.W.Va. 1973).
7 503 F.2d 1349, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1974).
Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir.), aff'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1950).
Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482, 483-84 (2d Cir. 1971). The A lomar opinion stated
that "[ilf and when additional exempt positions are to be subject to civil service
protection is a matter for action by the appropriate municipal and state authorities
and not by a federal court." Id. at 484. The Alomar court rejected the plaintiff's
complaint that she was discharged from her municipal position due to her political
affiliation and was therefore deprived of her protected first amendment freedom of
association. Id.
See Nunnery v. Barber, 503 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1974).
Id. The Fourth Circuit cited Alomar v. Dwyer, 447 F.2d 482, 483 (2d Cir. 1971).

Id.

,2Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert.
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conclusion that the plaintiff's first amendment rights were not violated was especially significant. The Fourth Circuit examined the
Seventh Circuit's proposition that judicial relief should be available
"where the dismissal is based solely upon a reason expressly proscribed by the First Amendment."' 3 The Seventh Circuit asserted in
Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis'4 that even though a "public
servant has no constitutional right to public employment . . . [he]
nevertheless may not be dismissed for exercising his First Amendment rights."' 5 In a significant departure from traditional analysis of
patronage discharges, the court held that, in certain situations, the
first amendment prohibits dismissals on the basis of political affiliation. The Seventh Circuit found' 6 that inhibition or interference with
the constitutional rights of certain patronage employees is impermissible," even where there may be no right to public employment.'8
The Fourth Circuit interpreted Lewis as holding that the class of
constitutionally protected patronage employees includes only those
in non-policy-making positions performing non-discretionary, routine
denied, 410 U.S. 928, 943 (1973).
11Id. at 579.
" 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972). Plaintiffs in Lewis claimed that they were discharged from the Illinois Secretary of State's Office for reasons of political affiliation,
such discharges violating their rights under the first and fourteenth amendments.
Plaintiffs had been employed in routine building functions such as maintenance workers and janitors.
473 F.2d at 571, citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972). The
I6
Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court decision in Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972). See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). Perryand Roth
developed important principles concerning deprivation of procedural due process from
non-tenured public employees. See text and accompanying notes 39-49 infra. The
cases, however, are analogously important when considering patronage dismissals resulting from failure to meet any conditions imposed on such employment.
" 473 F.2d at 571, citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). Perry dealt
with a claim of right to employment by a teacher in a non-tenure system. The Supreme
Court found that if non-renewal of a single-year contract was based on the teacher's
exercise of his right of free speech, due process had been violated. In addition, if that
teacher had "expectancy" or entitlement of employment, he was also entitled to procedural due process.
Perry held that a non-tenure system does not in itself defeat a claim under the
first and fourteenth amendments. A benefit such as public employment cannot be
denied through a discharge in a manner infringing on constitutionally protected rights.
Thus, lack of tenure is immaterial to a claim that a benefit was denied as a result of
the exercise of free speech.
" Although an employee has no right to a governmental benefit, the government
may not infringe on his constitutional rights once a benefit is actually conferred. See
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); note 17 supra.
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functions. 9 The court acknowledged that although legislatures are
primarily responsible for eliminating patronage injustices and establishing civil service laws, courts are not prohibited from finding that
patronage employment removals are unconstitutional. The Nunnery
court found, however, that not all public employees can be protected
by judicial review of constitutional challenges. 2 As a result, the
Fourth Circuit resolved that constitutional protection for political
activities of public employees depends on the classification of the
21
employee and the nature of his assigned duties.
In Nunnery, policy-making employees were differentiated from
non-policy-making employees. 22 The court concluded that employees
in policy-making positions or in policy implementation functions
may be excluded from protection,2 and that West Virginia had made
a legislative determination that liquor store managerships were appropriately patronage positions. 21 In the Fourth Circuit's view, such
an employee classification is subject to judicial scrutiny only if it is
arbitrary or irrational. 25 The court found that the assignment of Nunnery's position as a policy-oriented function was neither arbitrary nor
irrational since it conceivably resulted from the belief that "[1]iquor
control is always a sensitive issue in government and requires strict
supervision and control.""0
503 F.2d at 1354. The Seventh Circuit later characterized Lewis as having
generally disapproved on first amendment grounds patronage dismissals of non-policy making public employees, while affirming the right
of a public executive to use political philosophy or affiliation as a basis
for discharging policy making officials.
Indiana State Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Negley, 501 F.2d 1239, 1239 (7th Cir. 1974)
(emphasis in original).
See 503 F.2d at 1352-53.
"

21 503 F.2d at 1353.
2 Such latter functions include positions in which employees are "maintenance
workers, elevator operators, janitors and comparable employees." 503 F.2d at 1353-54.
2 Id. See Burns v. Elrod, 509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1975), which found that justification for dismissal of a policy-making employee "turns on the specific duties and responsibilities of the particular employee, not his title." Id. at 1136.
24 503 F.2d at 1357. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60-2-12 (1966). See also W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 29-6-2 (Repl. Vol. 1971).
503 F.2d at 1356-57.
28 Id. at 1357. Such an exercise in policy position classification was anticipated
by Judge Campbell in his concurring opinion in Lewis, in which he expressed apprehension over judicially classifying employees "engaged directly or indirectly in the
formulation or implementation of policies." Judge Campbell stated:
It is simple enough to say that janitors, clerk-typists and elevator
operators are "non-policy making" employees, but how far up in the
bureaucratic echelon can the distinction be judicially drawn?
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Patronage employment conditioned on restriction of first amendment rights is unconstitutional unless justified by strong state interests,2 and the state bears the burden of demonstrating its interest in
regulating the speech of its employees. 2 The reasonableness of such
regulation necessitates a balancing of the state's needs and requirements with the employee's rights and responsibilities.29 Government
administrators may require a method of personnel selection, such as
patronage appointment, designed to assure consistency of views and
performance objectives. In this regard, political affiliation may be
relevant to compatibility." Furthermore, state interest in a patronage
system may include a reasonable desire for political loyalty and responsibility of employees.' Nevertheless, although a state may have
important interests in monitoring the political affiliation of public
473 F.2d at 578 (Campbell, J., concurring).
See Indiana State Employees Ass'n, Inc. v. Negley, 365 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Ind.
1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1974). In that case, plaintiffs challenged their
political dismissal from the Indiana Department of Public Instruction as violating their
freedom of association. The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's determination
that plaintiffs "could have been classified either as policy-making employees 'or as
employees exercising the public functions of the Department." 365 F. Supp. at 232.
The district court in Negley, however, found that Lewis should be confined tQ its
facts. Id. The court emphasized that patronage dismissals are not constitutionally
prohibited and that the subject of political patronage employment is a matter for
executive and legislative consideration rather than judicial restructuring.'Id. at 23334.
1 See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Keyishian V. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Some courts have determined that public employment may be subject to restrictive conditions on the basis that it is a privilege and not a right. See Alomar v. Dwyer,
447 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1020 (1972); Bailey v. Richardson,
182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). In Nunnery, Judge Butzner
stated in his dissent that "[this interest is confined, however, to the reasonable needs
of promoting the efficiency and integrity of public service." 503 F.2d at 1361.
Restrictions of first amendment rights are justified only when either specifically
delimited or in satisfaction of a public need. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960). Employees as well as state officials must be responsive to public need, and
patronage appointments may provide employee responsiveness in this context.
See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See also Judge Butzner's
dissent in Nunnery which expressed doubt over the plaintiff's claim that legitimate
state interests would not be advanced by required employee participation in partisan
political activities. 503 F.2d at 1360.
11See Indiana State Employee Ass'n, Inc. v. Negley, 365 F. Supp. 225 (S.D. Ind.
1973), aff'd, 501 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1974).
' But see Illinois State Employees Union v. Lewis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972),
which found that political loyalty is immaterial to the productivity of a non-policymaking employee. Id. at 574.

510

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIII

employees, any curtailment of the freedom of expression must be
carefully examined."
The Fourth Circuit in Nunnery found that Nunnery had waived
her constitutional rights by accepting a patronage position 33 which
was conditioned on certain restrictions of those rights. Courts have
traditionally held that a patronage employee who knowingly accepts
political conditions of employment waives any objection to dismissal. 31 Courts have generally emphasized, however, that waiver of
a constitutional right is subject to close examination 5 and must be
shown to have been made voluntarily and with full knowledge of all
consequences.3 6 In Nunnery, the court pointed to the plaintiff's
awareness that her employment was a political appointment-a position which could be terminated under the same circumstances as it
37
had been granted.
In addition to Nunnery's first amendment claim, the Fourth Circuit also considered whether discharge of a patronage employee was
a deprivation of property without procedural due process in violation
of the fourteenth amendment.3 8 The court noted that a public em32 See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 349, 360-61 (1958).

503 F.2d at 1358.
The Fourth Circuit stated that plaintiff Nunnery "voluntarily accepted the
patronage position, with a full realization of its conditions and its hazards." 503 F.2d
at 1358.
American Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Shapp, 443 Pa. 527, 280
A.2d 375 (1971), relied on the concept that an employee may waive his constitutional
right to contest his dismissal on the basis of political affiliation: "Those who, figuratively speaking, live by the political sword must be prepared to die by the political
sword." 280 A.2d at 378. That case held that patronage employees accept the terms of
their employment and retain no right to procedural due process and no constitutionally
protected right to political employment.
I See 473 F.2d at 573-74.
Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). See Comment PatronageDismissals:
Constitutional Limits and Political Justifications, 41 U. CHi. L. REv. 297, 314-15
(1974), which challenges the voluntariness of a patronage employee's waiver of objections to political dismissal.
" Plaintiff's employment was contingent on continued partisan political activities. The court stated that a public employee
accepted his job with knowledge that he would be fired if, and when,
the appointing officer was replaced by a member of the opposite party
• . .waived any right to object to the fully anticipated event which
has now come to pass.
503 F.2d at 1358. The court in Nunnery also pointed out that the plaintiff had voluntarily chosen a patronage position over an available civil service position and "knew from
the outset she was entitled to no civil service status." Id. at 1359.
1 Id. at 1352-56.
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ployee has no property right to continued employment unless there
is a "legitimate claim of entitlement."39 A patronage appointee ordinarily has no expectation of continued employment under his terms
of employment." However, the Nunnery opinion suggests that, under
the policy or non-policy classification system, due process protection
might be provided to employees in non-policy-making functions.,,
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that actual classifica2
tion is a task more appropriately undertaken by the legislature.
Accordingly, patronage discharge is subject to judicial review only
when the legislature's categorizations are arbitrary or irrational.43
Unconstitutional deprivation of rights will not ordinarily be at
issue if a claimant is not actually entitled to a particular position.
The Supreme Court has determined that in the absence of entitlement, an employee cannot be wrongfully deprived of his position;44
legitimate employment expectancy depends on explicit rules and
practices, rather than an employee's unilateral expectations." In the
aftermath of Nunnery and Lewis, rules for finding deprivation of a
patronage employee's rights of due process might logically be predicated on whether his job is characterized as policy or non-policy
oriented. 4 This distinction may be a viable basis on which to prove
that a non-policy-making employee has a lggitimate property interest
in continued employment, 7 and should be protected from dismissal
Id. at 1352 n.10, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
See 503 F.2d at 1352. See also Roth which stated that a property interest in
employment is "created and defined by the terms of ... appointment." 408 U.S. at
578.
' See 583 F.2d at 1352.
'
'

42

Id. at 1356.

4 Id. The position of liquor store manager in Nunnery was characterized as a
"sensitive" one, thus rationally classified by the West Virginia legislature as beyond
the purview of procedural due process. Id. at 1357.
" The Supreme Court explained entitlement thusly:
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than
a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
45 The Supreme Court has stated that property interests are not constitutionally
created, but "are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those
benefits." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151 (1974), quoting Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
11See 503 F.2d at 1356-60.
47Perry defined property interests as follows:
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without procedural due process.48
The Fourth Circuit's analysis in Nunnery seemingly allows traditional principles of non-review by the judiciary to remain relatively
unscathed. After Nunnery, and the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Lewis notwithstanding, courts may appropriately review the constitutionality of patronage dismissals of non-policy-making employees,
although the first amendment still does not prohibit all patronage
discharges on the basis of political affiliation. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed that a state's legitimate interests in regulating public employees' speech and association will normally prevail over the interests of policy-making employees in exercising their first amendment
freedoms..
C. Employment Discrimination: Mitigation of Damages and
Reasonable Refusal of Alternative Employment
Unitary conversion school desegregation combines existing segregated schools into a single integrated system. This method has precipitated many procedural problems of integration.' Where school
integration has resulted in school closings after consolidation, black
educators have been particularly subject to discriminatory employment practices, 2 such as racially motivated dismissals and demo"[Piroperty" denotes a broad range of interests that are secured by
"existing rules and understandings." . . . A person's interest in a
benefit is a "property" interest for due process purposes if there are
such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim
of entitlement to the benefit ....
408 U.S. at 601, quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Is If due process is not available to protect a patronage employee in the absence
of a statutory right to employment, it has been argued that an employee should not
be discharged solely for exercising his first amendment freedoms. Judge Butzner dissented in Nunnery:
Mrs. Nunnery's lack of a property interest in her job affects her right
to procedural due process. . . .It does not in itself defeat her claim
that her discharge was an unlawful retaliation for her exercise of first
and fourteenth amendment rights.
503 F.2d at 1360 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970).
2 See note 27 infra. Discriminatory employment practices and procedures occurring upon desegregation through consolidation have been the focus of much judicial
scrutiny. See Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.
1969), which presented definitive criteria for establishing unitary conversion procedures. The criteria emphasized preventing demotions of black staff members. See also
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tions.3 When damages are sought for an allegedly wrongful discharge
or demotion,' the questions of mitigation of damages and refusal of
alternative employment become critical. The Fourth Circuit considered these issues in Williams v. Albemarle City Board of Education.'
In Williams, a black school principal sued for reinstatement and
damages following the closing of his segregated school and his allegedly discriminatory demotion to assistant principal with teaching
duties.' In its first decision of the case,7 the Fourth Circuit affirmed
the district court order that Williams be reemployed, holding that his
demotion had been racially discriminatory. The circuit court concluded, however, that damages should have been reduced because of
Williams' failure to mitigate his loss.8 On rehearing, the court reconsidered the damage issue and reversed its original decision, holding
that Williams was under no obligation to, reduce his damages by
accepting reemployment as an assistant principal.'
An employee who has been wrongfully discharged cannot generally recover damages for that amount which could have been earned
with reasonable diligence." The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed this principle" and the concept that "the aggrieved party is not compelled to
Bassett v. Atlanta Indep. School Dist., 485 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1973); Jackson v.
Wheatley School Dist., 464 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1972); Lee v. Macon County Bd. of
Educ., 453 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1971); Hegler v. Board of Educ., 447 F.2d 1078 (8th Cir.
1971); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968).
Singleton defined "demotion" as including reassignment to a position of less
responsibility or remuneration or to a position requiring less skill. 419 F.2d at 1218.
'See, e.g., Chambers v. Hendersonville City Bd. of Educ., 364 F.2d 189 (4th Cir.
1966). See generally Griffis & Wilson, ConstitutionalRights and Remedies in the NonRenewal of a Public School Teacher's Employment Contract, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 549
(1973); Jefferson, School Desegregationand the Black Teacher:A SearchForEffective
Remedies, 48 TUL. L. REV. 55 (1973); Note, Damages Under § 1983: The School
Context, 46 IND. L.J. 521 (1971).
3 508 F.2d 1242 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'g in part 485 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1973).
' Williams brought-suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 485 F.2d at 232.
7 485 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1973).
x Id. at 233.
508 F.2d at 1244.
" RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336, comment d at 537 (1932), explains that
mitigation of damages is not a "duty" in that failure to lessen damages does not affect
a plaintiff's legal action or available remedies.
The doctrine of avoidable consequences or efforts to minimize damages has been
explained thusly:
Damages are not recoverable for harm that the plaintiff should have
foreseen and could have avoided by reasonable effort without undue
risk, expense, or humiliation.
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 336(1) (1932).
" 508 F.2d at 1243. See also 11 S. WILLISTON § 1359 (3d Ed. 1968) [hereinafter
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enter into any type of employment, and is permitted to decline a
position which will degrade or lower his calling or usual means of
support.'

2

Additionally, the burden of proving the availability of

suitable alternative employment is upon the employer."
In Williams, the Fourth Circuit considered whether the plaintiff
had unreasonably refused proffered employment as an assistant principal with teaching duties within the same school system." The court
affirmed the district court's finding that Williams' rejection of tendered employment was reasonable, 5 since he was not required to accept an "inferior," more "menial," or less familiar position which
might jeopardize his future career and professional reputation.'6 The
Williams court determined that acceptance by Williams of a teaching
position in the same school system would have constituted acquiescence to his discriminatory demotion to an inferior position."
The Fourth Circuit did not establish a specific standard to determine damages upon the reasonable refusal of a demoted school employee to accept alternative employment. The court held that Wilcited as WILLISTON]. In a § 1983 civil rights action, "the normal rules of mitigation
apply to these damage determinations." Smith v. Board of Educ., 365 F.2d 770, 784
(8th Cir. 1966).
, 11 WILLSTON, supra note 11, § 1359 at 307-08, quoting Canning v. Star Publishing Co., 130 F. Supp. 697, 700 (D. Del. 1955).
," 11 WILLISTON, supra note 11, at § 1360. In Hegler v. Board of Educ., 447 F.2d
1078 (8th Cir. 1971), the court stated: "[tihe overwhelming authority places the
burden on the wrongdoer to produce evidence showing what the [plaintiff] could have
earned to mitigate damages." Id. at 1081. See Jackson v. Wheatley School Dist., 464
F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1972); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968).
Cf. Hill v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 390 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1968).
" The court applied the standard that a demoted teacher or school administrator
may not recover damages after unreasonably refusing acceptable alternative employment. 508 F.2d at 1243. See, e.g., United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist.,
484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973); Rolfe v. County Bd. of Educ., 391 F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1968).
,s 508 F.2d at 1243-44. The court stated:
The District Court in this case, it is conceded, made no explicit finding that the appellee's refusal of the offer of alternative employment
was reasonable. However, such a finding is implicit in the findings
made and conclusions reached by the District Court.
Id. The issue of reasonable refusal is ordinarily a factual issue, the determination of
which is reversible only upon a showing clear error. Id. at 1243, citing Green v. Kaynar
Mfg. Co., 369 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1966); American Trading Co. v. Steele, 274 F. 774 (9th
Cir. 1921).
" 508 F.2d at 1243. See 11 WILLISTON, supra note 11, § 1359 at 306; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 455, Comment d at 373 (1957).
'1 508 F.2d at 1244. But see 508 F.2d at 1244-45 (Bryan, J., dissenting), which
described Williams' subsequent employment as a teacher as a voluntary choice. See
note 29 and accompanying text infra.
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liams was not required to take an inferior position which might jeopardize his career. "Status" was held to be more determinative of a
position's acceptability than comparable salary.'" Unfortunately, the
court failed to enunciate any criterion to measure the status associated with alternative employment.'" Instead, the Fourth Circuit
analyzed Williams as a close factual question."0 The court did not
consider specific standards to be applied objectively, but rather resolved the factual question from the subjective point of view of the
injured party." The Williams court considered broad concepts of position inferiority, insufficient experience qualifications, and injuries to
career and reputation, 2 according to Williams' beliefs as perceived by
the court.3
Comparability and suitability of employment alternatives may be
objectively determined by evaluating an employee's background and
experience. 4 Unacceptable employment includes only that which
involves a reduction in responsibility or is essentially different from
the work for which the employee is qualified." In a school context,
comparability of employment status can be determined by examining
the essential difference in status between school administration and
teaching. 8 This difference, and the related concept of demotion from
11508 F.2d at 1243. The court cited NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307
(D.C. Cir. 1972), to support the premise that a demoted or discharged employee is not
required to lessen damages by seeking and accepting employment outside that field of
work for which he is qualified. Id. at 123 n.2. That latter case, however, was subsequently reinterpreted by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to require a broad
duty to mitigate damages 505 F.2d 391 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
11See 508 F.2d at 1243.
10Id. The court explained that
whether the refusal to accept alternative employment is so unreasonable as to preclude recovery of damages by the improperly discharged
or demoted employee requires a weighing of many facts and circumstances.
Id.
I2 Although the court stated that the factual issues were matters for the district
court, it considered possible avenues of subjective justification of Williams' refusal of
the proffered alternative employment in the absence of objective criteria for evaluation. Id. at 1244.
12 Id. at 1243.
2 The Fourth Circuit was concerned with what Williams believed was an inferior
or a more menial position, whether he "felt a possible lack of present qualification to
engage in actual teaching," id. at 1244 (emphasis added), and whether Williams
believed that his acquiescence would injure his reputation. Id.
24 See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1971).
21 Cf. Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1971).
21 The difference in employment status between school administration and teach-
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administrative to teaching positions, is contingent on a quantifiable
variance or loss of responsibility. 7 Loss of responsibility and professional status is prevented only by continued employment in a comparable position. 28
The Fourth Circuit in Williams held that damages will be
awarded to a wrongfully demoted school employee absent proof thatthe employee unreasonably refused an offer of employment in a position comparable to the employee's former position. However, the
court failed to articulate the concepts to be applied in determining
the propriety of a refusal, even though mitigation of damages "frequently involves the establishment of a standard of reasonable conduct. 12 9 In the school context, a teaching position is inferior in status
to an administrative position, and a demotion to a teaching position
may give rise to recovery of damages. The Fourth Circuit applied
these principles without making an objective inquiry into Williams'
ing was examined in Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 1104, 1109-10 (5th
Cir. 1971). In a fact situation similar to that in Williams, the Fifth Circuit in Lee held
that a former black principal had the right to regain a comparable position as soon as
possible following desegregation despite his interim holding of a higher-salaried teaching position. The court stated:
if a principal is demoted or dismissed pursuant to a desegregation
order and if his objective qualifications for his principalship do not
diminish in an absolute sense after the issuance of the order and his
demotion or dismissal, then he must be given opportunity to assume
any new principalships or any positions tantamount to his lost principalship prior to the offering of the position to new applicants of another race.
Id. at 1111 (emphasis in original). See Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School
Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969), which presented criteria for reinstatement following desegregation-caused faculty displacement.
" The Fifth Circuit in Lee observed; "The real gist of demotion is a reduction in
responsibility, not in salary." 453 F.2d at 1109. Cf. Jefferson, School Desegregationand
The Black Teacher:A Search for Effective Remedies, 48 TUL. L. REv. 55 (1973), where
it is stated,
With the actual elimination of the black school, the principal is faced
with complete separation from his profession or assignment to less
prestigious and less profitable positions. The consequences of displacement for the black principal include greatly reduced authority
and professional status, lowered visibility .
Id. at 63.
" See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 453 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1971); Singleton
v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 419 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1969). Cf. Bassett v.
Atlanta Indep. School Dist., 485 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1973). Comparability of position
and responsibility in a school context can often be gauged by distinct employment
qualifications ordinarily recognized for administrative and teaching functions. Id.
" 11 WILIUSTON, supra note 11, § 1353 at 274 (footnote omitted).

